Tuesday, 22 September 2015

Tagore’s earthly powers

Tagore's earthly powers



Book Details

Rabindranath Tagore

CHIRAKUMAR SABHA (THE BACHELORS' CLUB)

Translated by Sukhendu Ray
217pp. Oxford University Press. Rs450 (£24.99).
978 0 19 809944 4

Amiya P. Sen, editor and translator

RELIGION AND RABINDRANATH TAGORE

Select discourses, addresses, and letters in translation
242pp. Oxford University Press. Paperback, Rs495 (£29.99).
978 0 19 809896 6

The rational spirituality that drove India's literary Nobel Laureate

RINKU CHATTERJEE

"Great books", as Michael Crichton once observed, "aren't written, they're rewritten." A conscientious littérateur, Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) evidently believed in the efficacy of revision. He reworked the idea behind The Bachelors' Club through several genres – novel, story, satirical sketches – for more than two decades, before finally publishing it in its final form as a play in 1926.

Even without knowing this, the reader might be justified in seeing Tagore's drama as a rewriting of Love's Labour's Lost: it tells of three young men called Bipin, Shrish and Purno, who vow to follow the example of their leader Chandra Babu by remaining celibate and dedicating themselves to social causes. They do not, however, have any concrete plans for achieving anything. Removed from practical life, their half-baked theories are, at best, farcical; their aim is to eradicate poverty from India, and they contemplate manufacturing matchboxes as a good way to begin. As they while away their time bandying lofty rhetoric, an erstwhile member of the club, Akshay Mukhopadhyaya, now happily married to Purobala, contrives to effect matrimonial alliances between his two sisters-in-law, Nripabala and Neerabala, and Bipin and Shrish, at his wife's insistence. Helped by his brother-in-law, Rasik Chakravarti, an elderly bachelor, and his widowed sister-in-law, Shailabala, who joins the bachelor's club pretending to be a man (Abalakanta), Akshay achieves his aims after a series of comical incidents, which includes driving out unwanted suitors. The seemingly most steadfast bachelor of the club, Purno, falls for the charms of Nirmala, Chandra Babu's niece, thereby giving the play a comedic ending promising multiple marriages.

Although it has the tropes of a romantic comedy, The Bachelors' Club is essentially satirical in tone. Emerging at a time when women were beginning to play a greater role in urban social life, it raises some important questions about the relationship between men and women in the public sphere, as illustrated by Nirmala's impassioned plea for the right to be included in the club: "Those other members who are apparently dedicated to serve the country, who are prepared to renounce the worldly life and yet cannot openly accept a woman, equally inspired by the same spirit of service, as a member, I suggest they better remain family men". The well-educated and otherwise eloquent men, who regularly engage in intellectual debates, display a complete ignorance about the proper etiquette of interaction with young women, and are reduced to tongue-tied incoherence in their presence.

Written during the Indian freedom movement, The Bachelors' Club also satirizes the impractical goals of the many self-appointed freedom organizations that made celibacy and monastic life prerequisites for social work: "the idea of a band of men, after renouncing the world, dressed appropriately, of cheerful countenance, going round the length and breadth of the country, and spreading our message through songs, through speeches ought to be beneficial". Settling down as a responsible householder, Tagore suggests, isn't so bad an idea, either. As in Shavian drama, he persuades us to laugh at the hypocrisies of the genteel middle classes, as well as those of so-called intellectuals. The impressive rhetoric of the debates that Shrish and Bipin engage in essentially lack conviction, and their scholarly discussions concern the common man, even as they display an astounding ignorance about the world they inhabit. The play aims to fulfil the Bergsonian moral role of using laughter as a means to create better human behaviour. While entertaining them, Tagore brings his audience to what Shaw might have called "the melting mood", to make them recognize and accept their follies.

In the introduction to the present edition of the play, Sibaji Bandyopadhyay points out that Tagore's inclusion of songs and poetry "creates a linguistic ambience advantageous to the art of mirth", and also that it can only be fully appreciated in the context of Tagore's literary output, and of the contemporary intellectual milieu in India. This new translation does justice to the spirit of the play, meanwhile, as Sukhendu Ray, aware of the limitations of translating one idiom into another, opts to remain faithful to the meaning rather than metrical strictures of Tagore's verses.

Besides being a rigorous social critic, Tagore was also one of the foremost Indian thinkers of his time. Religion and Rabindranath Tagore illustrates his profound involvement with contemporary leading philosophical ideas, especially those of the Brahmo Samaj (the Bengali Reformist movement founded by Raja Rammohun Roy). Tagore had inherited the legacy of the Brahmo Samaj from his father Maharshi Debendranath Tagore, the leader of the Adi Brahmo Samaj. The speeches and letters in this selection illustrate Rabindranath's thorough knowledge of the Hindu philosophical tradition, especially Advaitism (the principle of non-duality), which is based on
the Upanishads, and which was also largely the basis of the doctrine of Brahmo Samaj. "In the light of the Upanishads which he mastered," Tagore writes in "The Mystics of Medieval India", "Rammohun was able to perceive the Hindu, the Muslim, and the Christian in their true identities. His intelligence and magnanimity of heart enabled him to preach the unity of man in a country marked by acute social differentiation."

As with his fellow reformers, Tagore's spirituality is intrinsically connected to the nationalist movement, which aimed at bringing about social unity. In this regard, the non-duality principle of the Brahmo Samaj, of which Tagore was a staunch advocate, proved very useful, since it emphasized the equality of all human beings, refreshingly different from the divisive influences of caste and religious distinctions. The Brahmo Samaj, moreover, was a key organization that worked towards achieving social changes by helping to "eradicate many malpractices and superstition. In particular, it has helped bring education to Indian women, to generally improve their social status and to bring to them their natural rights as human beings".

Religion or Dharma for Tagore is as much about a way of life as it is about an organized community, and it is based on compassion, a sense of unity and a desire to better one's spiritual existence. In keeping with the beliefs of the Samaj, Tagore emphasizes a personal relation with the Almighty outside any kind of authoritative mediation: "I do not consider the guru to be a mediating symbol. All I know is that God directly manifests himself where man achieves true fulfilment . . .". In a letter to Kadambini Dutta of July 4, 1910, Tagore condemns image worship: "Gods that are conceived or crafted as images are strongly bound up in their personal histories: they are born and they die, they marry and beget children, and are visibly affected by feelings of anger and jealousy. Surely, we abuse our own intelligence when taking such histories to be credible".

In his introduction to this volume, Amiya P. Sen argues that Tagore's endeavour was "to further humanize God and bring out the spiritual potential in men": "Anthropocentrism and not anthropomorphism is perhaps a better description of the nature of this enterprise". Spirituality, for Tagore, is essentially the search for supreme truth. In this pursuit, he uses his vast learning without lapsing into pedantry, and explores the meaning of spirituality and his own existence rationally and relentlessly. In Atmaparichay (1917), an account of his search for self-identity, Tagore states: "I cannot, with any clarity or definitiveness, claim to comprehend what religion means to me. It is not something that is prescriptive, nor written down in the form of philosophical discourse. Once detached from everyday life, it is quite impossible for me to understand this religion". The realization of one's spirituality is not a condition but an ongoing process. The recognition of "Truth", according to Tagore, is an essentially aesthetic experience that can be achieved through the appreciation of nature, and even love. He argues that the saints of the Bhakti movement (a religious reform movement in medieval India, which also advocated an intimate relationship between God and His worshippers), such as Nanak, Kabir, Dadu and Gyandas, were also poets in their own right – their poetry stemming from their unique gift of perception. It was principally for the "poetic thought" of works such as the intensely spiritual Gitanjali (1910), of course, rather than the satirical Bachelors' Club, that Tagore received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913.


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Choosing a tongue

Choosing a tongue

Dalit migrant, 1947

Book Details

Rosemary Marangoly George

INDIAN ENGLISH AND THE FICTION OF NATIONAL LITERATURE

285pp. Cambridge University Press. £60.
978 1 1070 4000 7

Language and identity vie for the right to India's national literature

NAVTEJ SARNA

The English language has always had an uneasy and complex relationship with the Indian state, being simultaneously the language of the colonizer as well as a bridge to the wider world. It is difficult to deny the advantages Indians have gained from knowing the language. In the early twentieth century, literacy in English served as a hallmark of upward mobility even as the struggle against British rule gathered strength. Given this contradiction, a certain amount of self-consciousness about English was natural. Gandhi began his first public political speech after his return from South Africa in 1914 with an apology for speaking in English; he yearned for a day when people would speak a language that would reach the "heart of a nation". ­During the freedom struggle, English, though spoken by a minority, effectively became the language of the elite, the language of power and that of the struggle itself. During the drafting of the Indian Constitution, the article on a national language was the most hotly debated; Hindi was finally selected to be the "official" (and not national) language of India with English to continue, for a further fifteen years at least, for those official purposes for which it had been used so far. The final version of the Constitution was first produced in English; yet English, despite its wide usage, does not appear in the twenty-two officially recognized languages listed in the eighth schedule of the Constitution.

Against this background, Rosemary Marangoly George examines intricate issues of language, literature, criticism and nationhood in her ambitiously argued Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature. George's point is that what came to be known as representative or "national" Indian literature was not an organic creation but a deliberately constructed edifice in the years leading up to independence and beyond, and that English played a major role in this exercise. She critically examines the work of Mulk Raj Anand and R. K. Narayan (who along with Raja Rao were the Indian writers best known abroad before Independence, mainly because they wrote in English). Narayan's vision of the caste-ordered but benevolent world of Malgudi that idealized a simple past based on "Indianness" and Anand's progressive, socialist championing of the downtrodden in a colonial setting were ready grist for a literary establishment, including the State-sponsored Sahitya Akademi (Academy of Letters) working to create a singular united national literature out of diverse linguistic and literary traditions. The result was a vision of an India with a past as well as a future, a nation deserving of and ready for freedom – and, once free, capable of claiming its place in world literature. In this endeavour, it was "Indianness", the commonality of spirit and a collective cultural inheritance that was to be celebrated; divisive themes and more immediate literary concerns were underplayed. Ironically, the language that could best take this message of the nation – without sounding parochial or regional – to international audiences, either in original or translation, was English.

This effort to build a national literature meant that much else of perhaps greater merit remained in the shadows, limited to vernacular audiences, simply because it did not fit into a uniting national vision or was not translated into English. This is the inheritance bequeathed to the postcolonial literary establishment in India: it is writing in English that occupies centre stage at the glitzy literary festivals, receives the huge advances, the generous reviews and awards, the sales; the rich literatures of Indian languages still finish a poor second, waiting for the translator's magic wand. What has faded is the preoccupation with portraying a united nation. Writers explore a greater breadth of themes now, including divisive ones; an uncharitable view would be that such themes make books easier to sell abroad as Indian exotica.

George examines Mulk Raj Anand's novel Untouchable, first published in 1935 and recently reprinted with a fluent introduction by Ramachandra Guha, to show how a national reading has subsumed an essentially social reading. Much like Raja Rao's Kanthapura and R. K. Narayan's Waiting for the Mahatma, Untouchable has been read predominantly as a "Mahatma" novel, essentially because of a cameo appearance by Mahatma Gandhi in the novel, Anand's uncorroborated claim – made as late as the mid-1960s – of Gandhi's direct influence on the draft during the author's stay at Sabarmati ashram, and Anand's assertion that his earlier novels were banned by the British. George argues that, contrary to this retrospective view, Untouchable concentrates on the social imperative of abolishing caste hierarchy rather than on anti-colonialism. In fact, it questions the Gandhian approach to untouchability.

A close reading of the novel would appear to bear this out in significant part. Confined Joyce-like to a single day, but written with a clunky realism, Untouchable follows Bakha, a young sweeper boy in the mould of a noble savage, through his day in a cantonment town. He is alternatively angry and submissive, his smouldering rage contained by the fatalism of generations, as he struggles with the dehumanizing burden of being a scavenger of human excrement, the ritually polluting profession of his forefathers. The day's events underline the deep discrimination that defines the caste system. There is the angry street brawl when Bakha accidentally brushes against a high-caste Hindu; the temple priest who accuses him of polluting the temple even as he makes lecherous advances towards the boy's sister; the low-castes waiting on the village well for a high-caste to draw water for them. Bakha yearns for change, for a life beyond the cleaning of latrines and hurling of abuse, even the life of the European sahibs – a life of "strange, low canvas beds covered tightly with blankets, eating eggs, drinking tea and wine in tea mugs, going to parade and then walking down to the bazaar with cigarettes in their mouths and small silver-mounted canes in their hands". He expresses his emancipation through random items of European dress that he picks up from the rag-sellers in the cantonment – a regulation overcoat, breeches, puttees and ammunition boots.

Anand offers Bakha several alternative ways out of the rigid caste hierarchy. There is the option of conversion to Christianity at the hands of Colonel Hutchinson, the local Salvation Army padre who scouts the outcaste colony to win over souls for Jesus with his caste-free sympathy – only a racist outburst from Hutchinson's working-class wife ruins the attempt. Bakha then joins a crowd of "all the different races, colours, castes and creeds" drawn to the magnetic, Messiah-like presence of the Mahatma. The political context is Gandhi's recent fast unto death to oppose separate electorates for the untouchables (or Dalits) which he regarded as another manifestation of British divide-and-rule policy, arguing that he represented all untouchables, or Harijans (people of God) as he called them. The Dalit leader, B. R. Ambedkar, a staunch Gandhi rival and the eventual Chairman of the Drafting Committee of India's Constitution, rejected this attitude of inclusivity without equality; he withdrew his demand for separate electorates only under pressure from Gandhi's fast.

Bakha reacts to Gandhi's remarks un­evenly: he is happy to hear that untouchability is a sin and a blot on Hinduism and that Gandhi wishes to be reborn as an outcaste. But he considers it unfair that the Mahatma believes that the untouchables must purify themselves, "rid themselves of evil habits, like drinking liquor and eating carrion", in order to achieve emancipation. The confusion anticipates the difference in approach of Gandhi and Ambedkar. The latter, whom Dalits in India today regard as their true emancipator, did not believe that the consciences of upper-caste Hindus could be aroused through persuasion and ­preferred a more drastic path. Decrying ­Gandhi's idealization of the village, he pushed instead for rapid urbanization and industrialization which would enable the untouchables to follow dignified professions. The most appealing solution that Anand offers Bakha at the end of the book is technology, when a modernizing poet points to the limitations of Gandhian thought and argues that the import of the flushing Western toilet may quickly end untouchability.

Untouchable accurately reflects central Dalit concerns of the time: the daily humiliation, demands for education and temple entry, access to public wells, sexual vulnerability of Dalit women. Yet Bakha is too much of an individualist, only incidentally worried about his community's concerns, and Anand is ultimately an upper-caste outsider with an angry edge and sympathetic eye. More authentic Dalit voices have long since eclipsed the novel in their expression of caste discrimination. Thus while Untouchable may not convincingly be a Mahatma novel, neither is it Dalit literature. But neat labels sit uncomfortably on great works of passion and art: Untouchable remains relevant in a country where, as Guha says ,"untouchability has been challenged, but by no means ended" and whose new Prime Minister in his Independence Day speech from the Red Fort in Delhi called for a national drive to build toilets.


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Monuments to Liberty

Monuments to Liberty



Did Thomas Paine write the whole of Rights of Man, and if not, what does that mean for our understanding of the French Revolution?

JONATHAN CLARK

Here is a familiar outline account of the French Revolution, long established and echoed in various forms in many textbooks. The Revolution's antecedents can be traced to Louis XIV. He was a despot: by show and ostentation, he lured the French into an attitude of subordination and political passivity. Only among subsequent philosophers was a spirit of liberty preserved. Montesquieu gave that spirit veiled expression. Voltaire dared to write open satire against statecraft as well as priestcraft; he deserves the thanks of mankind, whatever his personal motives. Rousseau and Raynal expressed high ideals of liberty. Quesnay and Turgot showed that the administration of government could be reformed. Together, they spread throughout their country a spirit of political inquiry, and prepared the way for the reception in France of the example of the American Revolution.

The French troops who served in America during the revolutionary war learned lessons about the practice and principle of liberty. News of the American Revolution, circulating in France, proclaimed the rights of man and justified resistance to oppression. Little of America's impact was owed to France's chief minister, Vergennes, who was by his nature a despot, but something was owed to Franklin, America's minister at the French court, and something also to Lafayette, the French soldier serving in America, who was familiar with colonial leaders and their civil government. After the peace in 1783, returning French soldiers and officers carried the spirit of liberty back to France.

There, Louis XVI's minister Calonne had by his profligacy destabilized French national finances; theparlements resisted the imposition of new taxes, and their resistance evoked national support behind those ancient institutions. Thus opened a period of political manoeuvre in which the ministers attempted to secure backing from other bodies, and so to circumvent the troublesome parlements. These political intrigues, at court and in the newly summoned Assembly of the Notables, turned out badly for Calonne, who was dismissed after Lafayette's charge that he was guilty of corruption. Lafayette also sought to close the Bastille and abolish lettres de cachet, which effected arbitrary arrest, but a majority of the nobles in the Assembly still supported both. Conflict over the national finances continued. Lafayette countered a ministerial attempt to make the Assembly a tax-granting body; when the new prime minister, the Archbishop of Toulouse, forced the registration of additional taxes at a royal lit de justice, the Paris parlement resisted, and the King was induced to promise the recall of the Estates-General.

Louis's ministers tried to frustrate that recall by establishing a new constitutional body, the Cour plénière, but this initiative was checked, the Archbishop fell, Necker was restored as minister, and the Estates-General assembled for the first time since 1614. Its recall only opened up endless political conflict over its composition and procedure. Finally the Third Estate claimed the authority of the nation and renamed itself the National Assembly; the First and Second Estates then joined the Third in this single chamber, by implication possessing sovereignty.

Certain malcontents from the clergy and aristocracy sought to prevent this amalgamation of chambers, but they provoked a widespread national anti-aristocratic reaction. Led by the Comte d'Artois, the King's brother, these malcontents now tried to close the National Assembly, whose members reconvened in a nearby tennis court and showed their resolve to defend their new institution. The plot for a military coup was pressed forward, but the scheme was foiled. The ministers ignored Lafayette's three attempts to send deputations from the National Assembly, over which he now presided, to confer with the King, until the moment when the ministers' position suddenly disintegrated. They now fled, the Bastille fell, and the troops that had been converging on Versailles dispersed. Counter-revolution was frustrated. Without seeking retribution, the National Assembly set about forming a constitution founded on the rights of man and the authority of the people.

This is an agreeably familiar story; so deeply absorbed, indeed, that its status as just one possible interpretation of complex and chronologically extended events has been largely forgotten. Historians labour to refine or diversify this version, but most of them now once more sympathize with its essentials. With the decline of the Marxist model of the French Revolution in recent decades, interpretative fashions have drifted back to this older reliance on the Enlightenment and natural rights, and on the teleology that saw these discourses slowly growing since the late seventeenth century, spread by prophets and pioneers, but eventually triumphant in 1776 and 1789.

Beyond the ranks of professional historians, the wider public is subliminally convinced that that was, broadly speaking, how things were. This deep conviction can be explained, for the story as set out above is only an abridgement of the account that first appeared in Thomas Paine's phenomenally successful Rights of Man (1791). About 6,000 words in length, it forms the central historical passage in that work. It is located in its pages just before the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, a famous document which therefore appears to vindicate the preceding narrative. Few of the component parts of this story were wholly new, but in Rights of Man they were memorably drawn together and given classic expression. To English-speaking observers it seemed that the story must in its essentials be true, since Paine was there to observe events, and since Paine, as England's greatest revolutionary, naturally had a unique insight into the nature and causes of what is conventionally termed the "Age of Revolutions".

Rights of Man certainly achieved canonical status. Published in that remarkable work, this model has powerfully shaped the understandings of the French Revolution held by anglophone readers from 1791 to the present. They (and I) came to take it for granted, and so we failed to notice the problem. This 6,000-word narrative is eloquent, idealistic and visionary. There is, indeed, only one difficulty: Paine cannot have written it. He wrote it out; some of it he put into his own words; but he cannot have been the primary author. If so, this model cannot rest on his authority. Indeed, its status as merely one possible interpretation comes again into focus.

Paine was undoubtedly the author of the remainder of Rights of Man, and its readers have naturally looked to that work for an explanation of the French Revolution. But the adulation or blame heaped on Paine's book by its supporters or opponents has occluded the strangeness of this 6,000-word passage. It is, to begin with, different in tone from the rest of the work. The prose is unlike Paine's, although he evidently contributed some phrases (the joke that "nobility" was just a synonym for "no-ability" is one he may have remembered reading in the local newspaper when he was an exciseman in Lewes, Sussex). He may have been responsible for the report of the Comte d'Artois's visit to the Parlement of Paris on August 17, 1787 – "I was then standing in one of the apartments through which he had to pass, and could not help reflecting how wretched was the condition of a disrespected man" – though this is not certain.

Elsewhere, Rights of Man displays Paine's typically prominent authorial voice; by contrast, this narrative is mostly written in a mandarin third person. Paine was a master of the direct and the specific; this narrative is often couched in uplifting generalizations. Examined more closely, its prose seems not to be that of an Englishman at all; it reads like the English prose of a native French speaker. A research team at Iona College, New York, is engaged on a computer analysis of Paine's known prose against the prose of certain anonymous works conventionally ascribed to him, and we await the publication of their results. Meanwhile, caution is appropriate. The ascription of authorship on the basis of prose style alone is notoriously treacherous. Paine's style was highly distinctive; even so, a subjective judgement that this narrative passage was not primarily by Paine would be inconclusive if the argument were not supported by evidence. I contend that it is so supported.

First, what of the content of this narrative? It, too, is unlike anything else in Paine's writings. Elsewhere, he showed no significant knowledge of French history, although he was well informed about English history since the Revolution of 1688. Paine did not elsewhere discuss the Frenchphilosophes in any depth, or credit them with a key role in preparing the ground for revolution. He did not analyse the French parlements, or compare them with the Westminster Parliament and the colonial American assemblies. Immediately after the Peace of 1783, Paine did not elsewhere assert any great lesson brought back to Europe by the returning French troops.

More telling again, he did not elsewhere reveal knowledge of French high politics after the fall of Necker in 1781. For Paine, politics was merely "jockeyship", not the difficult and respectable art of getting important things done. The author of this narrative boasted of knowing "a sort of secret history" of the way the First and Second Estates in the Estates-General merged into the Third: Paine made no such boast of privileged access about any other French political episode. In other places he wrote nothing of the Assembly of the Notables, or the Cour plénière, or the complex political manoeuvres that surrounded such bodies. He would not have understood exchanges of conversation like that between the Comte d'Artois and Lafayette, printed in this narrative, for Paine did not speak French. In any case, his humble social standing meant that he could not have moved in court circles.

Rights of Man did indeed cite one French source for the history of the Estates-General, L'Intrigue du Cabinet. This was evidently Louis-Pierre Anquetil, L'intrigue du cabinet sous Henri IV et Louis XIII terminée par la Fronde (four volumes, Paris: Moutard, 1780). But since he was not a French speaker, Paine was unlikely to have found his way to this text himself, or understood it if he had found it. In general, this narrative gave an insider's view, and Paine, while in France, was never an insider. Even had he been a member of the social elite, he was out of France for most of the time covered by this passage, for he was in America from November 1774 and (except for one brief visit) returned to France for an extended period only in May 1787.

Who, then, can have written this 6,000-word narrative? I suggest that its author was probably Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette (1757–1834), and that it embodies not neutral history but his very personal perspective on events. What evidence supports this ascription? The author would have needed to know much about France: to have formed views on the significance of Louis XIV's monarchy, on the general impact of the writings of a series of philosophes, on French public opinion, on the possible relation of the American war to France, on the history of the parlements, and on the detail of French high politics from 1783 to 1789. The author may also have had a grudge against Vergennes and Calonne, and a strong admiration of the Marquis de Lafayette, since the hero of this narrative is none other than Lafayette himself, whose role it consistently overstates. (Lafayette was not exactly "chosen to preside" over the National Assembly: he was only elected to fill the chair during late night sittings, which would have been beyond the strength of the elderly Archbishop of Vienne, and there is no record that Lafayette did this on more than a few such occasions.)

Especially, Lafayette's lifetime's achievement was in America, and this episode the narrative foregrounds. "The peculiar situation of the then Marquis de la Fayette is another link in the great chain", declared Rights of Man. "He served in America as an American officer under a commission of Congress, and by the universality of his acquaintance, was in close friendship with the civil government of America, as well as with the military line. He spoke the language of the country, entered into the discussions on the principles of government, and was always a welcome friend at any election." Arguably, this passage was expressed in the third person in order to conceal the vanity of its author. The overstatement continued. Thanks to his experience in America, Lafayette "was better acquainted with the science of civil government than the generality of the members who composed the Assembly of the Notables could then be"; consequently, "the brunt of the business" in that Assembly "fell considerably to his share". These were hardly modest estimates.

Earlier in Rights of Man, Paine acknowledged that Lafayette had provided him with the text of "some proposals for a declaration of rights" made "to the National Assembly, on the 11th of July, 1789" and Paine offered a reason for his friend's bringing it forward then ("M. de la Fayette has since informed me"). Rights of Man heaped praise on the Frenchman's role in the American Revolution: "His conduct through the whole of that enterprise is one of the most extraordinary that is to be found in the history of a young man, scarcely then twenty years of age". Paine recounted Lafayette's farewell address to Congress, which he is unlikely to have witnessed. So we know from elsewhere in Rights of Man that Lafayette provided Paine with information, and at least one document.

It has also escaped notice that the organization of Paine's famous book is, in part, repetitive. For this 6,000-word passage was not the only narrative about France in Rights of Man: there were two others, which preceded it. Indeed, the third and longer one oddly went over again the ground covered in the previous two: this suggests that the third passage may have been an interpolation, inserted by Paine when it came to hand. The first narrative, of about 2,250 words, concerned the fall of the Bastille on July 14 , 1789; the second, slightly shorter, covered the "October Days" of October 5–6 that year, when the Paris mob, or an organized part of it, marched to Versailles and compelled the royal family to return under escort to the capital, where they were henceforth effectively prisoners.

Paine's first narrative began with the evocative introduction: "The mind can hardly picture to itself a more tremendous scene than what the city of Paris exhibited at the time of taking the Bastille". Such expressions seem to give his account the authority of an eyewitness. In reality, Paine was in England at the time, and must have relied on others for his information.

Next, Paine turned to the October Days, challenging the accuracy of Edmund Burke's account of that episode. Again, Paine did not reveal that he had been in England at the time. His hero in the march to Versailles and the return to Paris was again Lafayette, who, according to Paine, restrained the Paris mob. "By an amiable and spirited manner of address, he had hitherto been fortunate in calming disquietudes, and in this he was extraordinarily successful." By his communications, sent by express, Lafayette had persuaded the King not to withdraw to Metz, but to remain at Versailles and so preserve the possibility of a compromise. Paine added a footnote: "I am warranted in asserting this, as I had it personally from M. de la Fayette, with whom I have lived in habits of friendship for fourteen years". At Versailles, "M. de la Fayette became the mediator between the enraged parties". The next day "M. de la Fayette had a second time to interpose between the parties". Thanks to Lafayette, the march to Versailles had a "peaceful termination".

Towards the start of Rights of Man, Paine had dramatized his idealistic rejection of Burke by quoting Lafayette's farewell speech to the American Congress. After the 6,000- word passage discussed here, in his "Observations" on the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, Paine applied Lafayette's speech to this subsequent French episode: "Having now traced the progress of the French Revolution through most of its principal stages, from its commencement to the taking of the Bastille, and its establishment by the Declaration of Rights, I will close the subject with the energetic apostrophe of M. de la Fayette – May this great monument raised to Liberty, serve as a lesson to the oppressor, and an example to the oppressed!" To this eulogy Paine added a footnote: "N.B. Since the taking the Bastille, the occurrences have been published: but the matters recorded in this narrative, are prior to that period; and some of them, as may easily be seen, can be but very little known". Other accounts of the taking of the Bastille had indeed appeared in print in England; but Paine wished to distance his own account from them. It seems he thought he had access to more reliable information.

Back in England, Paine set about writing Rights of Man, Part the Second, published in London in February 1792. It was dedicated to Lafayette. Returning to Paris in September that year, Paine at first stayed with his French friend. Indeed at that time he knew no Frenchman better than he knew Lafayette. And the strongest piece of evidence that Lafayette had supplied Paine with the substance of the 6,000-word narrative, as well as other information, came from Lafayette's own hand, for on January 12, 1790 he had written to George Washington: "Common Sense [Paine] is writing a Book for you – there you will See a part of My Adventures – I Hope they will turn to the Advantage of My Country and Mankind in General". The evidence, then, is cumulative, and Lafayette's letter importantly supports this contextual reinterpretation.

What, if this hypothesis is correct, were Lafayette's motives? He was an ambitious player in French Revolutionary politics, seeking to advance his own career and his own vision. This career soon ended disastrously when the Terror, spiralling out of control, threatened his own life, and he fled, surrendering to Austrian troops in August 1792. In France, Lafayette's name was henceforth widely disparaged. But at the outbreak of the Revolution, he had had bright prospects. What better way of propagating his version of events, with himself at their centre, than feeding his interpretation to his English friend, a brilliant journalist but one who knew little of France and would have been unable to check Lafayette's story? And it was a tribute to Paine's talent as a journalist that he could assimilate such information and use it to such effect.

It seems, then, that this passage is very probably not a history primarily written by Paine but in origin Lafayette's self-serving publicity, part of his attempt to become the George Washington of the French Revolution. If so, Paine seemingly accepted uncritically the account of his patron.

Indeed Paine was not a historian, and his status in some quarters as the key anglophone interpreter of his age calls for careful analysis; his achievements were different. He never wrote a full history of the French Revolution, or of the American. The confident historical claim of this de-attributed narrative that the American Revolution inspired the French needs to be treated with caution. Certainly, returning troops had some role in France. But there were few officers who took very prominent parts in French politics, apart, of course, from Lafayette himself.

If Rights of Man is not primarily Paine's reliable historical insight into the nature and causes of the French Revolution, what is the book's intellectual foundation? The title reasonably leads us to expect a work on natural rights theory, but that is not quite what we get. True, rights are everywhere in Paine's text, repeatedly invoked yet hardly unpacked other than to say that man has rights because God gives them to each individual at the moment of that individual's creation.

We must, then, re-examine the historical interpretation, dependent not least on Rights of Man, that the French Revolution was essentially a long-anticipated protest against natural rights denied and the instantiation of natural rights in a society that rights now transformed. If so, "rights" in Rights of Man begin to look somewhat different. No longer do they seem the intellectual core of the book. Increasingly, they look like truisms, the self-evident terms of a discourse that had broadened out to the point where their practical relevance was seriously diluted.

Indeed, Paine's English understanding of natural rights as divine gifts was different from the secular understandings that were evidently predominant in Paris. If so, in what sense were natural rights discourse and Enlightenment discourse, as echoed by Paine, really the keys to the "Age of Revolutions"? If Lafayette was indeed the primary author of this central passage of Rights of Man, the consequences for our general assumptions about this foundational episode are considerable, and Paine's undoubtedly important writings deserve a closer and less hagiographic reading than they sometimes receive. Historians have much re-thinking to do.


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Tsars to Tsipras

Tsars to Tsipras

RODERICK BEATON

Lucien J. Frary

RUSSIA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN GREEK IDENTITY, 1821–1844

320pp. Oxford University Press. £60 (US $100).
978 0 19 873377 5

At the beginning of the year 1843, the Greek government found itself without sufficient resources to repay the interest due on its external loan. One of the creditors, the Russian imperial government, came forward with a short-term bridging loan in March. But by May it was already clear that the unpopular austerity measures taken so far would not be enough even to repay the bridging loan, let alone the full amount of interest due on the external debt. And so on July 5, in London, a meeting of the three creditors (Russia, Great Britain and France) rescheduled part of the debt, taking effective control of the Greek economy to ensure that sufficient revenues were set aside to pay the annual ­charges. Then, on September 15, a coup d'état forced Greece's first king, Otto, to dismiss his government and grant a constitution. The King held on to his throne, but never regained his legitimacy in the eyes of his subjects after this first humiliating loss of sovereignty.

Sounds familiar? Replace the governments of the guarantor powers and the London Conference of 1843 with the Euro Summit in Brussels that dictated even more draconian terms to Greece, for very similar reasons, on July 13, 2015, and the script has hardly changed. At the time of writing, a new general election called for September 20 may once again bring about a change of government, and conceivably pave the way for a drastic change of alignment for Greece, with consequences no less far-reaching than those that followed in 1843–4.

In his new book, Lucien J. Frary helps us understand why. Ever since Greece became a sovereign nation according to the terms of the London Protocol of February 1830, signed into existence by those same great powers that would soon become the country's first creditors, successive Greek governments and elites have chosen to align the young nation state with Western Europe politically, culturally and economically – indeed in all spheres except religion. But when Prime Minister ­Tsipras and his energy minister (the latter now leader of an anti-European, anti-bail-out party) paid official visits to Moscow and St Petersburg in the spring and early summer of 2015, they were tapping into a deep seam of political memory among Greeks. Greece's westward alignment has never been achieved without cost, or without powerful internal upheavals. Again, Frary helps us understand the back story.

The first government anywhere in the world to enact policies that could loosely be termed "philhellenic" was that of Catherine the Great in the 1780s. When the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire proclaimed their independence and the Greek Revolution began in 1821, the foreign power most likely to take an interest in their cause was Russia, which shared their Eastern Orthodox religion, along with political and cultural traditions going back to Byzantium. According to the story that has been written ever since, at least in English, the Russians thereafter proved a dire disappointment to the Greeks, while harbouring expansionist ambitions of their own, against which Western European interests had to be constantly vigilant.

Frary has examined for the first time a huge reservoir of unpublished Russian archives, which he situates alongside an impressive armoury of Greek sources to produce a meticulous and generally dispassionate account that challenges this conventional narrative. At times, the sheer wealth of documentation threatens to obscure the bigger picture. When broader conclusions are offered, they often beg others, still broader. It is striking, for instance, to be told that "from a purely military standpoint . . . no power contributed as much as Russia to the establishment of independent Greece"; but then, when Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1828–9, Greek independence was not one of its war aims and was only appended to the Treaty of Adrianople as something of an afterthought, as Frary himself makes clear.

It is convincingly demonstrated that Tsar Nicholas I had no designs either on Constantinople or on extending the territory of his empire at the expense of the Ottomans. Frary thinks this is enough to explode the "Russophobic" assumptions of Palmerston (and, be it said, of almost all British philhellenes of the period). On the other hand, he provides plenty of evidence that neither the Tsar nor his foreign minister, Count Nesselrode, had the slightest regard for Greek self-determination. Tsarist policy, it emerges clearly, was to see established in Greece a client, absolutist, Orthodox monarchy along Russian lines, to the extent that this could be achieved without breaking the "rules" of the post-1815 international order.

What put an end to these aspirations was the successful coup d'état in 1843 that forced King Otto to grant a constitution. Frary reproduces, in translation, the vicious words of Tsar Nicholas about his abject fellow monarch and, worse, against his own loyal representative in Athens, Gavriil Katakazy, who emerges as the understated hero of the second half of the book. It was too much for the Tsar to stomach that the same political forces in Greece that were the most staunchly pro-Russian had also masterminded the coup against a royal head of government, and almost universally applauded it. None of the leaders of the new Greek state, for all their many faults, and their genuine reverence, in many cases, for the religious traditions upheld by Russian Orthodoxy, had the least appetite for the "Official Nationality" promoted by Tsar Nicholas, based as it was on the very absolutism against which Greeks had fought to the death during the 1820s.


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Before the regicide

Before the regicide

"Charles I at the Hunt", c.1635, by Anthony Van Dyck

Book Details

David Cressy

CHARLES I AND THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND

447pp. Oxford University Press. £30 (US $49.95).
978 0 19 870829 2

Reconnecting social and political history

MICHAEL BRADDICK

Charles I and the People of England is the latest in a number of attempts to reconnect the social and political history of seventeenth-century England. During the 1970s and 80s, historians challenged the dominant Marxist and progressive view that political alignment depended on social and economic characteristics, and that political upheavals had materialist explanations. One effect was that social and political history became separated. Political historians began to analyse political conflict in seventeenth-century terms, emphasizing the importance of individual experience and resisting attempts to "reduce" politics to the expression of material interest. At the same time a "new social history" developed, concerned with the realities of everyday life defined in conscious distinction from a dominant "national story": these historians focused on the politics of subsistence, household and village; of humble men and women, and their children, and social relationships among them.

Over the past decade or more, historians have tried to reconnect the social, political and economic history on new terms. Different areas in which this attempt has been made include the study of political communication and engagement, the communication of national politics to wider publics, and the influence of those publics on political life. Others (including me, I should confess) have attempted what might broadly be called "historical sociologies" of abstract political processes like state formation, the experience of authority, and the exercise of power. And the history of religious change now takes very full account of social and symbolic life in the parishes.

David Cressy has himself contributed to this literature, for example in books on how ordinary people spoke about politics, how religious change affected life-cycle rituals, and how parishioners reacted to that, and on how monsters and wonders might be interpreted in political (among other) terms. In his new book, however, he approaches the problem differently, setting out to explore the direct engagement of ordinary people (the 98 per cent of the population below the gentry) with the politics of Charles I's kingship.

Cressy writes evocatively, giving fluent snapshots of individual reactions to particular issues or events. But many of the most powerful descriptions rely on the reactions of the kind of elite figures who already occupy "standard" political histories of the period. In fact in several chapters the ordinary people hardly figure at all – for example, those on the coronation, and royal progresses – or are present as the silent participants in failed military expeditions or financial expedients.

In other places, the social status of those we are hearing is not clear. To take one random but unexceptional example, a single paragraph cites Robert Woodford, William Bisbey, Margaret Grigge and a source telling us what "many" were thinking. Only Grigge is accorded a social status (an "Essex countrywoman", in trouble for her opinions). This treatment gives a flavour of some of the discussion in the provinces rather than a systematic study of the responses of the 98 per cent to the doings of the 2 per cent.

Chapters on petitioning, reactions to the King's religious policies, and rebellion in Scotland in 1637, rest more squarely on the responses of the more humble. Here, as others have done, Cressy isolates an issue or episode which illuminates the relationship between ordinary people and high politics through relevant archival material. This is a less grand ambition than Cressy's introduction might suggest, however. There he promises to give an account of the reign in its totality, attending "to the religious aspirations and political expectations of a wide variety of men and women as they went about their everyday affairs".

He does this, moreover, almost exclusively on the basis of his own archival knowledge, hardly drawing on the wider secondary literature at all to supplement his own direct findings. This seems a disservice to his colleagues and a missed opportunity. Many local histories contain a wealth of material on the local impact of, for example, militia reform and forest regulation, as do studies of those things in and of themselves. Inevitably, Cressy is not familiar with all of the relevant sources – notably administrative sources. Without a grounding in this material, and without drawing on the existing secondary literature, his discussion of the social impact of some of these policies becomes impressionistic.

In other places the text seems led by a juicy example, rather than an argument developed from a more comprehensive sample. For example, the awareness of ordinary people of the expanding world of English trade and settlement is illustrated through the story of a sermon in Ashby-de-la-Zouch. It is not, though, explored in a sustained way in the religious debates of the late 1630s and (especially) 1640s, although in those debates reformation in England was discussed with close and explicit reference to the experiences of settlers in the New World.

Cressy's political narrative is also built around the primary sources directly under his command, with a similar result. He says, for example, that the constitutional implications of recruitment, billeting and wartime finance have not been fully explored, but his footnote does not refer to the literature on constitutional conflict during the 1620s. The rest of the chapter sets out examples of resistance to billeting and impressment, important issues, certainly, but has little to say directly about the forced loan of 1626, levied after Parliament refused to vote money to Charles, which gave rise to arguments of the highest constitutional importance. Cressy does not draw on the definitive study of the loan, by Richard Cust, either, (although that study contains important insights into the loan's impact on local society). When Cressy does turn to the Petition of Right of 1628, the discussion is very brief.

Cressy's subject is England, the largest of Charles's kingdoms, and the scene of most of the action that has been the stuff of conventional political history. This is a legitimate but unfashionable choice: it is now conventional that the political history of each of Charles's kingdoms (Scotland, Ireland and England) can only be fully grasped in the light of developments in the others. While Cressy is interested in ordinary English people's reactions to events in Scotland, his treatment of Ireland is more limited, despite the fact that the rising there in 1641 caused local panics in England and a crescendo of anti-Catholic feeling which played no small part in the outbreak of the English Civil War. The chief cost of his English focus, though, is that we learn little about how the reactions of ordinary Scots and Irish to Charles I's rule drove politics in all three kingdoms.

As Cressy says, "everybody knows" that the reign "ended in turmoil, regicide and revolution", but these final nine years of the reign are barely discussed. Eight chapters deal with the first fifteen years of the reign and the bulk of the remaining chapter deals with the period 1640–42. It would be a quite different project of course, but between 1642 and 1649 the relationship between Charles and his subjects was very clearly illuminated, and the actions of those normally outside the political nation can be seen to have had a clear effect on his fate. This is a big gap in the literature – as many others have noted, we lack a social history of the wars and revolution, although the materials for much of that history are available in existing studies, and the rich records of individuals, the presses and the parliamentary administration. Cressy, however, does not really attempt to fill that gap.

The distance between the conventional political narrative and the wider social context remains visible in much of the book. Charles I and the People of England offers overall a less reliable guide to the political history of Charles I's reign than Tim Harris's recent book Rebellion (TLS, July 11, 2014) , a study which also makes very effective connections between national politics and the lives of ordinary people. What David Cressy does very well, though, is give a series of lively illustrations illuminating aspects of what it was like for people of various sorts to live in these turbulent times.


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Catastrophe’s child

Catastrophe's child

Magna Carta at the British Library

Book Details

Anthony Arlidge and Igor Judge

MAGNA CARTA UNCOVERED

240pp. Hart. £25.
978 1 84946 556 4


Nicholas Vincent et al

MAGNA CARTA

The foundation of freedom 1215–2015
192pp. Third Millennium. £44.95.
978 1 9098 9028 0


Andrew Blick

BEYOND MAGNA CARTA

A constitution for the United Kingdom
314pp. Bloomsbury. £25.
978 1 849 46309 6

Magna Carta in the history of humiliating military failure and written initiatives to restore trust

LINDA COLLEY

In February 1840, at the Bay of Islands in New Zealand, forty-three Maori chiefs signed a treaty drafted by British colonial officials. Neither side possessed a remotely adequate understanding of the other's languages or political concepts and assumptions. Nonetheless, as more and more signatures accumulated, some Britons began to refer to this document as New Zealand's Magna Carta: but only for a while. During the later nineteenth century, it fell into neglect, and rodents and water were allowed to spoil the original texts. A sustained resurgence and re­invention of the Treaty of Waitangi seems only to have begun from the 1930s, but in recent decades it has been meteoric. On the one hand, Maori activists have made increasing use of these documents to campaign for enhanced rights and the restoration of ancestral lands. On the other, New Zealand governments have poured millions of dollars into their display and into developing public education schemes around them. Widely represented now as New Zealand's founding document and as a demonstration of its quintessential and pioneering multiculturalism, the treaty has helped to enhance both the country's sense of cohesiveness and its international profile. It also functions as something of an emotive substitute for the written constitution that New Zealand still lacks. Texts really can matter.

Yet establishing exactly how high-profile constitutional texts do sometimes come to matter massively is challenging. Despite the fact that they are usually legal documents, at least in part, their precise wording often plays only a very limited part in their public impact. Opinion polls suggest both that most Americans revere their Federal Constitution, and that many of them have never read it. Major constitutional texts are much more than legal texts, moreover. They also tend to include elements of imagination and invention. Yet although they have spread across the world more dramatically even than the novel, most literary scholars ignore them. Generally secular texts, they nonetheless almost always attract sacral language, and – exactly like holy books – are invariably ransacked and invoked to support wildly divergent ideological positions. And, as the Treaty of Waitangi illustrates, while iconic texts of this sort are historical documents, their interpretation and use can fluctuate sharply over time. There is a further reason why these texts are hard to pin down and understand. For obvious reasons, they easily become encrusted with patriotic significance and are usually approached only as sui generis productions. Yet most important constitutional texts possess transnational histories of some kind.

Since it is so old and so very famous, Magna Carta poses these kinds of challenges in spades. June 15 this year marked the 800th anniversary of the sealing of the original document at ­Runnymede, which is close to Windsor and about 20 miles west of Central London. This was also the first centenary year of Magna Carta since 1615 in which the island of Great Britain was not distracted by serious armed uprisings or major overseas warfare, and the commemorations have been extensive, well choreographed and self-conscious. There have been major exhibitions at the British Library and the Society of Antiquaries, and at various cathedrals and castles associated with the story. There have been radio and television programmes, public lectures, school competitions, commemorative stamps and souvenirs, and royal visits to Runnymede; and there has been a plethora of new books. The three under review are all well worth reading, and each employs different strategies to investigate this deeply ambivalent text. Magna Carta Uncovered, co-authored by a QC, Anthony Arlidge, and a former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Igor Judge, seeks to "uncover the medieval meaning of the Charter" and its evolution through a forensic analysis of its language. Nicholas Vincent's Magna Carta: The foundation of freedom 1215–2015 is the wonderfully illustrated companion volume to the British Library exhibition, but also much more; while Andrew Blick's highly intelligent Beyond Magna Carta combines a re-assessment of this ancient text with an argument for new constitutional writing in the UK in the future.

All three books confirm how much Magna Carta has always been a moving target. The original version survived only a couple of months, and there were fresh iterations in 1216, 1217 and 1225. Some of the initial clauses were cut and others amalgamated. Thus what became known as the "Golden Passage" – "No free man will be taken or imprisoned . . . save by the lawful judgement of his peers and/or by the law of the land. To no one shall we sell, to no one shall we deny or delay right or justice" – started out as clauses 39 and 40 in order (originally they were not numbered) before becoming known as clause 29. Even after the charter was entered into the statute book in 1297, understanding of its content remained in flux in part because extracts were sometimes read out loud in cathedrals, courtrooms and public squares, so men and women heard the document in different ways. In addition, the meaning of some of its most vital vocabulary altered over time. Initially, the charter's references to "free men" alluded only to those English inhabitants who were not villeins, perhaps a seventh of the population. Arlidge and Judge argue that ideas in this regard were already shifting by the 1330s, and certainly by the mid-seventeenth century some popular tracts were claiming the charter's provisions for all Englishmen (and occasionally and explicitly also for women) and interpreting its references to "liberties" as allusions to rights, not privileges.

All three books also go some way to demonstrating how inappropriate it is to approach the genesis of Magna Carta only in terms of England. The charter contains clauses relating to Wales and Scotland and was quickly extended to Ireland. Then there was the matter of varieties of French. Most of the leading actors in 1215 were Anglo-Norman. The very title "Baron" is of French origin. The Plantagenets too were hardly "English". As Vincent sets out with admirable clarity, the dynasty's origins lay in the Loire region and, by the twelth century, its dominion extended over Aquitaine, Normandy, England, part of Ireland, and even touched the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem. Even the most successful Plantagenet monarchs enjoyed only a mixed English reputation, but the reign of John, who was crowned in 1199, proved catastrophic. In particular, he was defeated in battle by the French King, Philip Augustus, in 1204 and lost control of Normandy, and there were further heavy military defeats across the Channel in 1214. To this extent, the genesis of Magna Carta possesses similarities with that of many other constitutional texts. Time and time again, humiliating military failures and/or over-extended and financially ruinous warfare have worked to undermine the authority of existing rulers and governments and energized political dissidents, and thereby established the pre-conditions for new, written political initiatives. Thus the contagion of written constitutions that occurred between 1750 and the 1830s is often put down to an "Age of Revolutions", but it can just as legitimately be linked to the long-term repercussions of the quantum rise in this period in the geographical scale and costs of war.

It was military failures more than his unattractive personal qualities (arguably exaggerated by subsequent chroniclers) that leeched John's authority. One of the insults flung at the King by opponents was the graphic "Soft Sword". As J. C. Holt noted in his classic survey of Magna Carta, military upheaval and defeats also prompted other twelfth-century and thirteenth-century European monarchs to make concessions in regard to liberties. Thus the War of the Sicilian Vespers, which began in 1282, both compelled Charles of Anjou to issue reforming ordinances, and led Peter III of Aragon to seek to curry favour with his subjects by conceding the Privilegio General. All three of these books maintain, however (and it would be interesting to know how far historians of Continental Europe and the world beyond agreed with this), that Magna Carta is a more developed and significant text than other, roughly contemporary royal concessionary documents. In retrospect, some of the charter's provisions undoubtedly did possess radical implications, though again not all of them stuck. Arlidge and Judge rightly devote attention to the so-called sanctions clause, which was pointedly abandoned in 1216. Originally, this provided for a kind of standing committee of twenty-five barons, along with "the commune of all the land", to "observe, maintain and cause to be observed" the terms of the charter. A monarch still viewed as divinely appointed was thus formally submitted to persistent supervision and potential correction by his ­subjects, and obliged moreover to agree that this should be so. Or that at least would be one interpretation of the clause.

But then, and as is the way with constitutional documents, so much to do with Magna Carta does depend on interpretation. Not only is this a relatively brief and shifting document that is now very old, but even its original drafters (whoever they were) may not fully have agreed on or understood its provisions. "It may be", comment Arlidge and Judge in lawyerly perplexity, that "the drafters of clause 39 were not entirely clear what its detailed meaning was". Moreover, there was an inbuilt tension in what happened at Runnymede on June 15, 1215, which has often been captured subsequently in art as well as prose. In Alexander Gibbs's stained-glass window of the sealing of Magna Carta installed in Mansion House in London in 1868, the politics involved are left visibly ambiguous. King John is shown enthroned in splendid robes, sceptre securely in hand. But the massed barons and knights who face him carry unsheathed swords and bristle with spears and axes. Are we witnessing essentially an ordered, negotiated treaty in which, as the Holinshed Chronicles tactfully phrased it, "God . . . touched the King's heart and mollified it"? Or is the essential moral of this scene rather the indispensability of armed resistance to correct unjust and arbitrary authority?

The longevity of such interpretational differences emerges vividly in Magna Carta: The foundation of freedom 1215–2015. Most of its chapters are the work of Nicholas Vincent, whose major research project into the charter, has uncovered much new material, but there are also contributions from specialists in other fields. More than anything else, three major developments can be credited with sharpening arguments over Magna Carta and fostering persistent interest in its meanings. First, the struggles between the Crown and the Westminster Parliament in the seventeenth century served dramatically to re-direct attention to the charter, and led to copious new writings and claims about it. Most durably perhaps, Edward Coke, who held a succession of high legal offices, and in the 1620s became a leading House of Commons activist, compiled a four-part masterwork, Institutes of the Laws of England, the first substantial work on English law in the vernacular. The second volume of this, especially, heaped honorifics on Magna Carta; and Coke's Institutes went on to become one of the foundation texts for the study of the common law throughout the British empire and on both sides of the Atlantic.

Second, and as Justin Champion outlines well in his chapter, the explosion in the volume and variety of print in England, Scotland, Ireland and the colonies, especially after 1700, helped make Magna Carta at once far more widely known and more diversely interpreted. On the one hand, establishment printed tomes such as the Statutes at Large represented the charter as the solid foundation of the English and British state. On the other, successive radicals and reformers such as John Wilkes, James Burgh and Granville Sharp drew on the document in newspapers and pamphlets in support of political change and a widening of rights. Disagreements over the document's meanings and potential were sharpened by a third development. The outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 offered a fresh example (to those wanting to think this way) of heroic and principled individuals fighting for their rights and freedoms against a tyrannical monarch, only this time with George III standing in for King John. Americans began to claim – as many still do – that it was they, not the British, who best understood and lived out the significance of Magna Carta. Or as Joyce Lee Malcolm puts it in the Vincent collection: "Magna Carta's legacy remain[s] . . . more vibrant in America than in the land of its origins". Moreover, independent Americans began producing their own canonical constitutional texts, the Declaration of Independence, the state constitutions, the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

After 1789, this new wave of written constitutions increasingly spread into much of Continental Europe and South America and, from the mid-nineteenth century, into parts of Asia, South Asia, the Pacific world and Africa. And it is this proliferation of rival constitutional texts across the globe that helps to account for what Miles Taylor describes in this collection as Magna Carta's "unrivalled reputation as a constitutional icon in Regency and Victorian Britain". To be sure, some radical groupings in this period, conspicuously the Chartists, busily referenced the text. But what was more striking was how much dominant groupings in the British state now made a point of celebrating it. References to Magna Carta in parliamentary speeches increased markedly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Allusions to the charter also featured prominently in Victorian art, architecture and iconography, not least in the ornament of a new House of Lords. It was invoked in support of Britain's imperial civilizing mission (hence Waitangi as the Maori Magna Carta). Most of all, constitutional history, a term first popularized by an Englishman, Henry Hallam, became a major publishing and pedagogic enterprise, helping to spread knowledge of a sort about the charter, and fostering its position in a national saga of steady and sagacious political advance. This remained the case into the twentieth century.

The claim often made now that the British are not interested in constitutional matters thus needs to be recognized as a relatively recent invention as well as a suspect one. Many Victorian and early twentieth-century Britons were passionately concerned with constitutional issues and with constitutional histories of a sort, and not just for domestic reasons. Making a cult of Magna Carta and some later constitutional texts, such as the Petition of Right of 1628, was in part a reaction and riposte to the rising trend among other nations to adopt written constitutions. Old writings were evoked and re­burnished in the UK not just out of patriotic conceit, but also as a means of countering the growing competition posed by some far more modern, foreign constitutional texts. Such responses became more self-conscious as British power began to wane. James Bryce was a Scottish liberal politician and academic jurist who knew more about the growing power of the United States and its constitutional pretensions than most of his compatriots. In 1917, as Britain struggled with the First World War and with the strains posed by its new American military allies, he summoned up in defiance the heritage of Magna Carta. "It seems not too fanciful", Bryce wrote, "to say that the prelates and barons of Runnymede, building better than they knew, laid the foundation of that plan of written . . . constitutions which has now covered the world from Peru to China". Far from being overtaken by other countries' constitutional innovations, it was the British who had pioneered them.

We can expect future commentators to devote considerable energy to discussing what this latest burst of Magna Carta enthusiasm in 2015 reveals about the ideas, ambitions and anxieties of those most involved. It seems highly unlikely that the celebrations will work to reinvent the text for current and future generations as New Zealanders have been able to reinvent and revitalize Waitangi. Indeed, Andrew Blick suggests that the commemorations this year should rather provide an opportunity and springboard for correcting the defects of the current, uncodified British constitution. He argues, with considerable erudition, that both the formation of the current British state and its constitutional practices have relied far more heavily on a succession of major texts than routine references to an "unwritten constitution" or to parliamentary sovereignty imply, and that a future UK written constitution would have "an important basis in our historic thought and practice". Well, yes and no. English and British constitutionalism have indeed drawn heavily on various iconic texts; but in England and Wales a powerful influence has also been exerted by the common law, which is essentially based on a series of precedents and judicial decisions, not on a written code.

Moreover, one comes back to the fact that most major constitutional texts have been an outcrop of war or some other major trauma (Waitangi itself was partly sparked by British fears about French ambitions in the Pacific). Established political institutions and norms usually have to be destroyed or seriously threatened – by wars, invasions, major breakdowns of civil order, colonial uprisings, revolutions, and the like – before vested interests and inertia can be overcome, and serious re-writings of a polity can begin. If, in the future, Scotland secedes, it is likely we will see both a new Scottish constitution, and almost certainly a written constitution emerging too in what remains of the UK to help reinvent its identity and prop up its legitimacy. Unless or until that happens, one might more feasibly look for rather more modest gains from the elaborate celebration of the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta. It would be good if it raised sensitivity to issues of rights and prompted a revival of interest in constitutional history, a subject badly in need of intellectual reinvention and adventurous widening. It would be good, too, if British legislators were reminded by these jamborees of how important constitutional texts can be, of how very volatile they are, and of how much serious thought and legal and historical knowledge – and luck – are necessary if they are to become entrenched and to function effectively. As it is, the powers that be here are currently engaged in pushing a new constitutional proposal for English Votes for English Laws, alias EVEL. Those unacquainted with Westminster politics merely have to pronounce this acronym, which has been cheerfully bandied about by ministers and their acolytes. Magna Carta was a very long time ago.

Wednesday, 24 June 2015